Articles

Asia Policy Assembly 2019 – Keynote Address: Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver

July 24, 2019



it is my honor and pleasure to turn this over to Senator Slade Gordon Randall Shriver is a relatively young man perhaps halfway through his that journey through the federal government as a public servant he started as a lieutenant in the Navy in the intelligence department went to the Department of Defense from the Department of Defense to being a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and now act as an Assistant Secretary of Defense but between his current position of its defense and his freedom one of the Department of State he was in the private sector as a consultant in a partnership with Richard Armitage a former Undersecretary of State my relationship with secretary Armitage was as a member of the 9/11 Commission when the Under Secretary was one of the witnesses on the biggest and most publicized of all of the public hearings we held biggest and most publicized because it took place just about three or four days after the publication of an expose of the Bush administration by Richard Clarke Richard Clarke had been the chief terrorism counsel to President Clinton and very much a favorite in that administration stayed on for a while with the Bush administration in a lesser position which he represented which he resented resigned and wrote a book basically blaming 9/11 on President Bush so when Richard Armitage who was Bush's Undersecretary of state sort of to testify one of my colleagues asked him whether or not he read Richard Clark's book I gave it a washington d-c read he said i looked for my name in the index I've never forgotten nothing and I have a one spot in my heart for Randall Shrivers the previous partner and and I assume friend in any event Randall Shriver is here to be our penultimate left keynote speaker and to this wonderful two days lesson and with that Randall driver whom I have just met well thank you very much I I'm not gonna say every day at the Pentagon is Wunderland easy and great but you do get some special experiences when you're in jobs like this and certainly an honor I'll never forget is being introduced by Senator Slade Gordon so thank you sir for that and thank you for your years and years of service and your continuing interest and devotion to this region and helping support American interests there thanks rich and and Roy and Phil and everybody who who's had a hand in putting this together and facilitating my participation this is a fantastic event I'm I'm cognizant that I'm standing between you and the end of it and whatever plans you might have whatever bar is have good happy hour rates but happy to close the session after what I understand have been very very excellent discussions I'd like to talk briefly about our indo-pacific strategy and some of the major challenges we're facing and how Department of Defense is implementing our national defense strategy and our new Indo Pacific security strategy so last week or maybe two weeks ago at shangri-la we issued our new Indo Pacific strategy report it is a strategy report it is not a new strategy but it is a comprehensive public articulation of how DoD plays its role in our White House sled indo-pacific strategy and we talk you know talk about the Washington Reid I know everybody turns to see how their country is mentioned and how we word certain things and we did take a lot of time and particular care and Industry we talked a lot about our unfolding competition with China but it's important to to note it's also nested under a whole-of-government strategy we we have an important role but but not the only role so we do talk about our economic strategy we talk about the the whole of government efforts that are being developed so that's that's the also the purpose of the report is to explain how we nest under that being as such that it's part of a whole-of-government strategy it's it's embedded in our vision for free and open indo-pacific and the shared responsibility we have to uphold that and so we are part of an effort to promote what we view as enduring and widely shared values and principles these include respect for sovereignty independence of every nation no matter its size peaceful dispute resolution without coercion free fair and reciprocal trade and investment and adherence to international rules and norms sustaining a free and open order will only be possible through the maintenance of a robust and persistent US military presence and credible combat power as well as the region's collective adherence to international rules and standards we think this is these principles are widely shared and supported but they aren't supported by everyone and not everyone shares this vision we understand from not only words but actions and stated intentions that although China has benefited from a free and open order the CCP under general secretary chair and chairman Xi Jinping's leadership is challenging the rules-based order and is working to transform this order that's more favorable to its authoritarian governance model China's of course not alone we see other challenges in the region Russia's actions continue to undermine the rules-based order we have continuing rogue and dangerous behavior from North Korea we have backsliding toward a liberal governance in countries such as Burma and Cambodia which challenged norms relating rights religious freedom and dignity we have persistent and evolving threats by non-state actors and terrorist organizations and we've seen recent attacks in the region particularly Southeast Asia we have emerging threats across a range of domains including what we regard as relatively new domains in the military space such as space and cyber and we have continuing transnational threats such as natural disasters and the impact of climate change Chinese ambitions however are of pressing concern as we've outlined in our national security strategy China seeks to shape a world order that is inimical to US interests and values they're leveraging their military modernization they're using influence operations engaging in predatory economic behavior and statecraft and coercion to pressure countries to heat its political and security agenda and ultimately reorder the indo-pacific to its advantages to its advantage so in other words China's assertive behavior and activities are designed with a clear purpose to displace the United States in the indo-pacific region to expand the reaches of its state driven economic model and to reorder the region to its favor which is counter to our vision for free and open into pacific order this matters because if the ccp's authoritarian approach were to become ascendant we could see a weakening of regional and global sovereignty of countries and leading potentially to the loss of access to global Commons we could see an erosion and certainly challenges to our system of alliances and partnerships we could see an undermining of institutions such as ASEAN and its member states we could see a diminishment of respect for individual and human rights and a potential normal as a of the brutal repression underway in places such as Shin Jang and Tibet and as we've seen just this past week the people of Hong Kong who bravely spoke out against the controversial extradition bill which could potentially expose them to China's justice system and further erode Hong Kong's judicial independence I know senator Gardner in his remarks here address that by saying that the demonstrators have shown to the world that Chinese democracy is alive and well and perfectly compatible with Chinese culture and history so we do see different visions we do see robust pursuit of their vision on the China side which we believes put us puts us now on a path to long term competition our competition with China is being played out in three specific ways first the region is increasingly confronted with a more militarily assertive and confident China that is willing to accept friction in pursuit of its interests the CCP under the leadership of Chairman she is challenging the rules-based order we see this clearly in the South China Sea and in Beijing's approach to Taiwan just to name two examples with respect to the South China Sea despite chairman Chi's pledge made in the Rose Garden of the White House in 2015 China has militarized the South China Sea they've conducted land reclamation on an unprecedented scale which involves extraordinary and environmental degradation and destruction they've militarized it's artificial features to assert its sovereignty claims and disputed waters early last year China delivered anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles to its Spratly Island outposts a clear sign that its intentions are not benign regarding Taiwan we see a whole-of-government campaign to intimidate coerce and destabilize Taiwan the CCP is seeking to diplomatically isolate Taiwan by stripping away diplomatic allies it applies economic pressure by cutting tourism it seeks to undermine Taiwan's democracy by meddling in its elections and it applies military pressure through its posture and its increasingly provocative exercises and operations and we should all be clear in our understanding of the ongoing threats and military coercion of Taiwan is destabilizing not just to Taiwan but to the entire region we see China number two we see China leveraging its economic instrument of power such as the one belt one road initiative in ways that erode sovereignty of other countries with the goal of changing their behavior to align with China's preferences I'd know that this has been a focus of your discussions over the last two days and I know it's been noted how China is using economic inducements and penalties and influence operations and implied military threats to persuade other states to comply with its agenda although trade has benefitted both China s trading partners Chinese use of espionage and theft for economic advantage and diversion of acquired technologies to the military remain a significant source of economic and national security risk to all of China's trading partners one-sided and opaque deals are inconsistent with the principles of a free and open end opa cific the third line of effort and where our competition is unfolding is we see the domestic governance of the CCP rule is increasingly authoritarian and increasingly cruel where human rights and dignity are concerned with more than half of the world's Muslim population living in the indo-pacific the United States and the region views the PRC's systematic mistreatment of we Gers kha'zix and other Muslims in Xinjiang including pervasive discrimination mass detention and disappearances with deep concern we're also concerned not only for human rights reasons which should be shared universally we do see potential linkages to security interests these practices could lead to a radicalization of this population and could potentially lead to terrorism to suggest that this is mere job training is unbecoming of a country that claims to aspire to great power status in short while our competition with China takes place at various levels what we are really competing for is to sustain a position of advantage so that we can maintain influence within the on regional order which in turn allows us to promote support and protect a liberal rules-based order whose institutions rules and norms have fostered peace and prosperity for decades we should note that while we compete vigorously with China we do sustain military-to-military contacts the primary purpose of which is aimed at reducing risk and promoting international norms and standards competition could and should be peaceful sometimes there's a notional understanding of competition that is different this may in fact even be cultural when Americans think of competition it can be thought of as good and mutually beneficial for China it can be seen as negative but for us oftentimes positive competition doesn't mean confrontation in all cases nor must it lead to conflict we seek to maintain competition as a stable deterrent to avoid conflict while the United States and China may not always agree we recognize it serves both our interest to cooperate where we can so briefly to close let me talk about how our competition with China is manifesting in the military space and what DoD's approaches to this competition China appears to have an advantage over the United States and its allies when it comes to escalating from the gray zone to conventional military operations or to pursue quick territorial gains through a fait accompli fait accompli strategy which carries significant implications if left unchecked but for us this means we must change our mindset as articulated in our national defense strategy the focus on great power competition as the primary focus of national security is appropriate and requires a fundamental shift in the way DoD thinks about deterrence and defense our goal is deterred is to deter China from pursuing a fait accompli and improve our capacity to deter and fight China at the outset of a crisis so the China understands unequivocally that pursuit of its objectives to reshape the regional and international order will not succeed through non peaceful means as I said this requires a shift in mindset and the types of conflicts we've been preparing for and thinking about and have been engaged in for the last couple of decades and now we must think about something other than a binary approach of peacetime vs. wartime and more to a mindset of enduring competition we're clear winners and losers are not always evident on a daily basis and where rules may often be fluid and open to interpretation we were no longer in a period of a merit of overwhelming American dominance but rather in one in which our armed forces are adapting to fight against near peer competitors thus instead of expecting to dominate the opponent our armed forces are learning to expect to be contested throughout the fight while achieving the political objectives set for them in light of these challenges we are changing our mindset and we have issued our indo-pacific strategy report which details our fundamental approach centered around what we call the three P's preparedness partnerships and promoting a networked region with respect to preparedness we are working to increase the lethality of the joint force and posturing ourselves in ways that are more appropriate for near-peer competitors we're increasing our investments in contested domains like cyber and space and other emerging technologies with respect to partners and allies we are interested in allies that themselves are more capable and able to protect their own sovereignty in their own interests but also partners that are willing to provide access provide diversification and and dispersal opportunities and help us compete in a region that is increasingly contested by virtue of China's growing capabilities and finally promoting a networked security architecture is important we have of course a legacy of hubs and spokes approach with that is reliant on our bilateral alliances we will continue to mature and develop our bilateral alliances but increasingly the challenges in the region the indo-pacific region are inherently multilateral and require collective responses so are working on trilateral relationships Australia Japan and the United States Australia excuse me Japan South Korea in the United States we're working with ASEAN as a entity and this year we'll be conducting our first ASEAN u.s. maritime exercise and we are working in through capacity building to be enablers to greater networking in the future we have an initiative called the maritime security initiative which is focused on giving capacity to countries so that they can sense share and ultimately contribute to maritime security in the region we support ASEAN member states in this initiative and are very active in developing the future security architecture so that it is more networked so to conclude we do see long-term strategic competition with China as the defining challenge of our generation and possibly beyond our trajectory is largely driven by the ambitions of Chairman she and the CCP elite and the acquisition of capabilities to apply that they apply toward realizing their ambitions we remain open to changing this trajectory and our vision for a free and open indo-pacific is in fact inclusive and affirmative for any country China included who choose to support the enduring principles embedded in our vision but we should be clear these are consequential times and consequential decisions we must take the costs associated with complacency will be extremely high but the benefits of competing well and competing to prevail are equally high with that I look forward to any questions comments criticisms but thank you again rich and Senator Gordon for giving me this opportunity [Applause] you tell me okay sir thank you thank you sir for coming to speak with us today my name is Jim flatty assistant professor at the air War College and ARP fellow you mentioned about cyber and space domains and I was just wondering if you could span a little bit on what DoD is doing and working with allies and partners in the region to establish norms and deterrence postures in those two domains thank you Thanks so we have a new cyber strategy at the Department of Defense and that strategy does talk about working with partners and allies we are doing a number of things on space some of which is well documented in the media the efforts to create a new space force interim step to create the space command in both domains if I could lump them together we have to meet partners where they are and where they are I mean not only in terms of their own capabilities and what they might be able to provide in a partnership and benefit from in a partnership but also the threats that they're facing so I think we have a near-term challenge with respect to Taiwan's upcoming election that we need to address in an urgent fashion and then we have challenges that are of a longer-term nature we very much want to strengthen our partnership with Japan which had threats and challenges but I think as some some work to do in terms of developing capabilities so we need we also need to fly the airplane while we're building it so we have a great partnership with Japan that is active but we need to build the capabilities to better position us over time well think as our as our strategy talks about we need to think about not only protection of our infrastructure and our own capabilities but we need to also think about how in in a warfare sense these integrate into our overall approach to war fighting and build that into doctor and etc Thank You Randy donghui Yu with China review news agency of Hong Kong and next week president Trump will meet President Xi in Japan how would you prepare for this meeting in terms of Milt mirin relations to make meal to meal relations to be continued to be less stabilizer rather than this stabilizer of the us-china general relations thank you sure we need to not only say that mil-to-mil relations are stabilizing factor we need to have activities that actually underscore that and support that and so we've been asking our Chinese counterparts to do more meaningful work in the areas of a number of activities but primarily illicit illegal transfers to evade UN sanctions China has voted for those sanctions support those sanctions but we need more action from China to take care of those activities that are taking place in Chinese territorial waters our representative at shangri-la still acting secretary Shanahan when he met with Minister way in Singapore presented him with a gift this was documented in the media and it was a picture book of North Korean related ship-to-ship transfers that were taking place in Chinese territorial waters it would be great if we could strengthen our cooperation military-to-military to deal with that real world problem that is quite pressing and urgent Thank You secretary my name is Genie Nguyen with voice of Vietnamese Americans yesterday senator garner stayed that he received a hearing two weeks ago that Vietnam and the South China Sea could be the first instant of kinetic challenge from China do you concur with that also that we heard that German champ of Vietnam may come to visit president Jang soon in July has that been confirmed and if so is there any steps that the DoD or you would take to help to help foster the relationship between Vietnam and the us to actually stabilize the situation in the South China Sea thank you well senator Gardner's been a great leader in the Congress on indo-pacific issues his his sponsorship and championing of the REO legislation was very significant and we mentioned that in our strategy report is a great example of how the administration and Congress can work together because we were very supportive of the REO legislation his comments on where we may see kinetic action I think are reasonable I hope we don't see it anywhere but certainly the South China Sea is increasingly dangerous space given the activities that are going on there and we've seen periods of higher tension between Vietnam and China some in some cases related to economic interests in the disputed territories we hope there's not any kinetic action but those are certainly two hot spots that we keep an eye on so I think senator Gardner's comments there are reasonable with respect to a potential visit from general secretary and president Truong I think it remains of interest on our part and and president Trump issued that invitation when Vietnam played host for us in the second summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim we of course understand health issues and the necessary period that may be required for the president to recover so I don't think we're in a position now to talk about specific dates but at DoD we are very supportive of strengthening military and defense ties with Vietnam last year was a historic year first year craft carrier visit since the conflict we have secretary mattis visited twice during a calendar year including to look at the work we were doing it being ha to deal with the dioxin remediation the Agent Orange that that was left behind and caused continuing problems there we have great cooperation on mi a cases where Vietnam is a terrific partner and helping us resolve those cases related to missing servicemembers so we're very supportive the relationship and if that meeting occurs you can be sure we'll have a lot of input into that agenda my name is Athena a reporter from the Radio Free Asia tomorrow the presidency jumping going to is in North Korea so I would I want to know how does this visit to North Korea do you think it will be helpful for United Stated we start negotiating those Korea and second question instead today the Steven began special envoy for North Korea mention that u.s. and DPRK does not agree the definition of a denuclearization so can you tell me how different definition of gain equalization between United States ap okay on your first question we we await the results of that visit I know see jumping at least under his name an op ed was released that talked about the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations with the DPRK and talked about the importance of that relationship our it's our hope that C Jinping is able to use whatever influence he may have in that relationship to persuade the DPRK did re-engage and re-engage in a meaningful way on denuclearization I can't amend or improve upon steve begans words in any way so i'll leave it at that but I will say the the reason we weren't able to reach a conclusion or an agreement I should say in Hanoi was because they weren't prepared to talk in a serious way about Dina to include even foundational issues such as a development of a common definition so I'll leave it at that mr. assistant secretary thank you you talked about the long term strategic competition being this defining challenge of our generation I'm wondering if the partners you referred to you know Pacific strategy documents are really geared up for this long-term challenge it seems that a lot of the regional partners while sort of wary of China are counting on a pretty strong economic relationship which I'm to feel their own internal growth to solve some of their own internal challenges I'm thinking particularly India so I'm wondering how how they reconcile that well we all have important trade relations with China ourselves included so it's qualitatively different I mean people sometimes refer to it as a new Cold War it may share some of those qualities but I can tell you – it'll be different if we're in this enduring state of competition given how integrated we are in our economic ties and that remains true for a lot of our partners I think you know we meet partners where they are in a lot of ways but one thing that we find almost universal agreement on is people want protection of their sovereignty they want to be able to make decisions from capital free from coercion or undue pressure they want peaceful approaches to any dispute resolution those aren't us initiatives or positions or principles those are widely shared if not universal so when we find we're engaging on those sets we find rapid agreement we don't ask countries to choose between a country like China and us we do ask if can support these principles and values and be a partner in promoting them we don't ask countries to end any kind of trade or economic relations with China we do say buyer beware though if if China is approaching with deals that seem too good to be true and potentially involve debt traps and other ways to ultimately gain more leverage and influence over the country in question secretary mattis used to say there's there's more ways than one to lose sovereignty you can lose it with a soldier holding your territory with a rifle and bayonet in his hands or you can lose it through a bad economic choice and I think predatory economics we've seen suggests that more awareness is required and countries need alternatives and that's where we have to step up – by the way it's it's one thing to say buyer beware but it's another thing to actually have alternatives and so through efforts like the build act we're trying to enhance our our approaches and we're trying to strengthen our cooperation with like-minded partners Japan Australia India us specifically about India they jealously guard their non-aligned status they have an important relationship with China but I can tell you I see a lot of convergence on the strategic landscape and the kinds of things we need to be doing together to prepare for that sir thank you fear marks Bob I quote from the Atlantic Council on the issue of dual use technologies and he kind of military fusion that they talk about can you say a little bit more about that in terms of how you you look at that question how you're working with industry US industry to perhaps increase their sensitivity to that issue and are you seeing industry being more cautious with regards to this issue yeah I think in general awareness is better and I think that's partly due to our efforts to educate and spread information you know frankly for a long time we were sort of unwitting partners to China's modernization including their military modernization because we didn't have our hands around this and you know there are some things you can do in sort of a general blanket way to tighten things up and in the other cases it's gonna have to be case by case with particular technologies so I would say the stage we're at is awareness is better we were building sort of the infrastructure to have those dialogues on a more routine routine basis we're reaching out to non-traditional communities because dual use technology doesn't always fall in traditional spaces the the Chinese have been creative in finding ways to get technology that's helpful that maybe we didn't originally anticipate would be helpful so I think we're at a stage where we're starting to get our hands around the problem I heard – a change of mindset at the Department of Defense I think in some cases there's a change of mindset that's needed with industry and you know in some cases that the choices will be stark you know you'll have a choice of doing business with the US government or doing business the way that has been done in the past with China in some cases it'll be more case-by-case and and working with industry in more collaborative ways but it's you rightfully point out that it's an important challenge thank you so you mentioned PRC selection interference against I want is the upcoming challenges that we are facing so my question is in terms of capacity building what could have one do to counter PRC's cyber attacks and disinformation campaign thank you it's a very important issue for us there's no question at least in our minds that China will try to meddle they've done it every previous election in 1996 it came in the form of missile exercises in a 2000 it was Jurong G's finger wagging and threatening of the people of Taiwan I think that that challenges the sophistication on the PRC side is growing and so what we expect this time is use of social media cyber intrusions etc it starts with dialogue and and I won't get into a lot of details you probably have some family relations that could tell you more about it than I could and getting the right experts together and then as required we will make direct contributions to to Taiwan's capabilities and and capacity to deal with this as the election approaches ma'am Thank You April her Livia with CNA and the National Asia Research Program during your comments on promoting a network security architecture you explicitly mentioned ASEAN but I'd like to hear more about other partners or regional institutions both in the Indian Ocean and Oceania that you think the Department of Defense could partner with so we're sort of open to a variety of modalities to promote that including ones that that were not necessarily a direct participant if there's intra Asia cooperation and here I'm thinking of something like the cooperation between Indonesia Malaysia and the Philippines that deals primarily with issues of crime and and potential terrorism and dealing with the return of foreign fighters etc we don't have to be in the room we don't have to be included in every – relationship but we do want to support them if they do have requests or requirements and so even in a case like that we're not at the table necessarily but all our partners Indonesia Malaysia Philippines in this case know that we stand ready to help them in their efforts there are other nascent efforts Indonesia has our eyes initiative which is counterterrorism related Singapore has the counterterrorism information facility that's a region initiative regional initiative it's it's owned by the region again we're happy to pay a play a supportive role if that's helpful I think when it comes to maritime domain awareness and and maritime security we will be an integral part of whatever we're able to develop over over the long haul because of the nature of the challenge and and what we can bring to bear but also how long the pole is in the tent for countries to develop that capability and capacity we'd be fine if we got to a point where everybody could at least see what was happening in their 12 nautical mile sovereign territory for the maritime States even better if they have if they can see and sense out to 200 nautical miles of their EE Z's but what we're really after is where they can see and share ultimately sea share and contribute and have assets that can be responding in cases where it's needed but if we can get to see sense and share that'd be that'd be really that'd be really good outcome sir hi Andrew yo Catholic University of America are you mentioned under partnerships that you want to see allies build up their own capacity I know that's been I'm a big thing with the Trump administration have you seen allies with our traditional bilateral Alliance partners or in Southeast Asia have you seen these partners stepping up or have has there been a boost in capabilities of what what progress have we seen there yeah I mean you'd have to disaggregate in an almost go country by country but I think the general trend is toward more more investment and an understanding and a willingness to share a larger portion of the burden I think you know Japan is probably or I should say perhaps the best example of that Japan is increasing not only its investments and its resources and its defence but is also doing things post reinterpretation of article 9 of its constitution to be more proactive in the region be able to take on not only its own defenses but and protection of its own sovereign territories but as primary Bay has said a proactive promoter of regional peace and stability so we're seeing that in a variety of ways you know we're we're were desirous of countries meeting certain fair standards and a president has been clear about that I don't think he's gonna back off anytime soon so you know we'll continue at the Department of Defense to be a voice for that as well but the the real key in our mind is not just how much you're spending but what type of capabilities are you investing in and so when we talk about capacity building it is with a purpose it is designed on the one hand as I mentioned to enhance maritime domain awareness and maritime security counterterrorism you know these key these key areas boa liebe Lou I have a question acting secretary Shanahan has said famously China China China when he was asked what the top issue in the Pentagon is do you expect secretary aspart to do the same thing Thanks I would expect continuity in support of an implementation of our national defense strategy certainly haven't seen anything that would suggest otherwise and in fact secretary Esper as Secretary of the army has been a key contributor to our efforts to implement the national defense strategy he is somebody with substantial knowledge of the region and China in fact he and I used to teach a university course together on China he's he's been a part of this administration's efforts and so I don't see anything that would suggest we're not gonna see Connie but he'll have his chance if he's either acting or ultimately the nominee to put his mark on things but I from everything I see he he's committed to continuity on on this front in particular sir Thank You Randy I think I think the first first indo-pacific strategy report is very historic as well as a three piece virology and including coding a Taiwan a country for the first time in 40 years in the United States I think I have been wondering what is DoD's strategy over cyber security including 5g because China is trying to dominate a cyber world thank you well our Department of Defense has put out a strategy for cyber and it's as I mentioned it's partly a development of our own capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and that's also reflected in our 2020 budget request it's also about developing new capabilities that can be integrated into our doctrine and ultimately our warfighting that may be of a different quality to have a deterrent effect not just in other words not just protection but to have the deterrent capability with respect to 5g and and the attention that's been given to Huawei in particular it's very important to us that we have partners and allies with whom we can exchange sensitive information that we can have high confidence that we can plan and operate with with high confidence that there won't be leaks or loss of intelligence so I think we're at a stage now where we're trying to have conversations on the front end and identify where the risks and vulnerabilities maybe not everybody starts from the same place there are countries that are significantly invested in 4G technology from Huawei they start in a different place than somebody who doesn't have that existing infrastructure but we need to make everyone clear on what the vulnerabilities and gaps may be and then ultimately what implications might be related to their choices and again our interests is in having allies and partners that we can share the most sensitive information and plan and operate with with great confidence that it will be secure [Applause]

No Comments

Leave a Reply